OPINION — What happens when an intelligence officer who has sworn to protect classified information can’t refute an erroneous news report or a mention in a book about him or her? I was yet again reminded of that conundrum when mention of me in author Tim Weiner’s new book, The Mission, was brought to my attention.
Recalling that author’s earlier anti-CIA tome, Legacy of Ashes, the probability – indeed likelihood – that he would get many things wrong was high. What was somewhat surprising was that in The Mission, he attributed actions and decisions to me without trying to verify with me the accuracy of his assertions.
Lies and twisted truths are, of course, not classified. But it is often the case that refuting or correcting them would require the exposure of classified information that a CIA officer has sworn to protect. Adhering to such obligations does not make the reputational cost of doing so any less galling.
Reputation is of no less importance in a profession that rests upon perceived judgement, trustworthiness and professional skill. There has always been an inherent tension between public perception – sometimes even caricature – of intelligence professionals and the private integrity they must exercise by turning the other cheek in response to falsehoods and erroneous information concerning them in fealty to their oaths of secrecy.
The current cadre of Agency officers is, by no means, the first to be faced with this situation. Earlier generations lived with the possibility that their names could be exposed or their actions called into question in books, newspapers or on network television. Thankfully, such incidents, however aggravating or unjust, were – by virtue of the information mediums of the analogue era – less frequent and almost invariably less widely disseminated than what we see in today’s click-driven culture.
In our age of mass media and leaks, it has become almost de rigueur for CIA officers to have actions, statements, or conduct attributed to them that are either distorted or flat out wrong.
Over the course of the last decade of my career and after my departure from CIA, I have experienced many such instances, most notably with respect to press coverage regarding my 2011 assignment in Islamabad and my purported downplaying of the possibility of a human spy within CIA while I served as Chief of Counterintelligence.
With respect to the latter, the truth was quite the opposite as attested to by my team’s identification of Jerry Chun Shing Lee as a traitor and my request for the FBI to join that investigation, both of which were rooted in my belief we were dealing with a human spy.
As for the former, the circumstances of my departure from Pakistan were sensationalized and my name recklessly exposed in connection with the Bin Laden operation, with all that potentially meant for the safety of my family. In most such cases, I have taken solace in the fact that the written, classified record will – when ultimately made public – convincingly set the record straight. With respect to the Weiner book, however, I am prepared to make an exception.
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At one point or another over the course of my career, I made almost every error an intelligence officer can make. The instances cited by the author were not among them. I won’t attempt to address in detail all the mistakes, mischaracterizations, and prevarications contained in what he wrote about those with whom I served. That would take too much time and involve too many classified issues. I will, however, try to address in general terms several of the author’s erroneous assertions where my name is invoked.
First, he claims I expressed doubt about the intelligence regarding the possible presence of Bin Laden in the Abbottabad compound. In fact, I was convinced High Value Target 1 – the moniker by which Bin Laden was then known – was there. Within the small group of those privy to details of the operation, I repeatedly stated that we needed to act against the target compound saying, among other things, that ‘The American people would not tolerate another Tora Bora’ and that ‘You can’t leave Hitler in his bunker and end the war’. The requirement to obtain additional intelligence in order to enhance confidence that Bin Laden was, in fact, there, came from Washington. My team and I acted pursuant to that instruction, employing the highest standards of tradecraft and professionalism in so doing.
(As an aside, the author’s assertion that the then-Director of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and I fought furiously over this matter is nonsense. We may have had differences of perspective on operational matters common to – indeed required of – intelligence professionals, but we were, and remain, colleagues and friends.)
Second, the author asserts that actions taken regarding Senate Staff and the so-called “Panetta Review” of CIA’s former enhanced interrogation program surprised the then-Director. The author claims I acted on my own initiative to investigate an unauthorized intrusion from the Senate’s CIA-hosted computer enclave – in violation of agreed procedures – into the broader Agency system to access the “Review.” In fact, I was not in the office when CIA leadership ordered my team to carry out that investigation. As I subsequently told the board conducting the after-action review of the incident, all activities undertaken by me, or those working for me, regarding that issue were carried out pursuant to instructions from CIA leadership.
Lastly, the author’s source or sources are in error regarding consideration of a possible criminal referral of me in this case. Other officers who were wrongly accused of acting inappropriately were considered for such referrals. That consideration ended after I told the enquiry board that those officers acted at the direction of CIA leadership.
Finally, the author says I retired from CIA in 2015, in part because I was not selected as the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO). I certainly was disappointed I did not get that job. And I did, as the author writes, support then-DDO Frank Archibald in his opposition to the diminution of the authorities of his office as part of the so-called “Modernization” of the Agency being implemented by the then-Director. My opposition was rooted in my deep concern over the likely harm implementation of that reorganization would wreak upon the Directorate of Operations. Among the most problematic aspects of “Modernization” was the severing of the DDO’s chain of command in directing CIA operations worldwide in favor of an arrangement wherein the DDO oversaw, as the then-Director put it, ‘the quality of operations;’ a move I felt would undermine both operational security and productivity.
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It was obvious to me that my future prospects in the Agency were bleak after the then-Director simultaneously removed me from my position as Chief of Counterintelligence and the Director of CTC from his post as part of what he characterized as an effort to end the ‘fighter pilot mentality’ in the Directorate of Operations. But my final decision to retire from CIA only came about after a representative of the then-Director told me I could only have another job if I publicly supported the “Modernization” plan. This, I said, I would not do because of the damage I believed that reorganization would do to CIA’s capacity to execute its core mission: the collection of human intelligence. Events since then have, sadly, proven me right.
As I have previously written in these pages, a secret intelligence service occupies a unique space in a democratic nation. I understand that the actions of that service and its officers will be subject to public scrutiny and questioning, and rightly so. In many such circumstances – particularly when the identities of personnel and agents, or the protection of sources and methods are at stake – silence is the only answer available. There are, however, rare occasions when honor dictates a more public response, while still protecting classified information. This is one of those moments.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
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